Evolutionary Game Analysis of Remanufacturing Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Asymmetric Information

Author: Li Jian   Du Weihao   Yang Fengmei   Hua Guowei  

Publisher: MDPI

E-ISSN: 2071-1050|6|9|6312-6324

ISSN: 2071-1050

Source: Sustainability, Vol.6, Iss.9, 2014-09, pp. : 6312-6324

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Abstract

Remanufacturing is an effective means to realize energy saving and emission reduction. This paper develops an evolutionary game model with a two-echelon closed-loop supply chain to study evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) of manufacturers and retailers. Through analyzing evolutionary path of the game, we find that there are two possible evolutionary results affected by the profits of manufacturers. Price of remanufacturing products may be a critical factor that determines the ESS. Government subsidy is critical to promote the development of remanufacturing industry.