Political Competition, Agenda Power, and Incentives to Innovate: An Empirical Examination of Vested-Interest Theory

E-ISSN： 1541-1338|32|4|413-442

ISSN： 1541-132X

Source： Review of Policy Research, Vol.32, Iss.4, 2015-07, pp. : 413-442

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