Strategic bidding in multi‐unit auctions with capacity constrained bidders: the New York capacity market

E-ISSN： 1756-2171|46|4|730-750

ISSN： 0741-6261

Source： THE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, Vol.46, Iss.4, 2015-10, pp. : 730-750

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