Private monitoring, collusion, and the timing of information

E-ISSN： 1756-2171|46|4|872-890

ISSN： 0741-6261

Source： THE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, Vol.46, Iss.4, 2015-10, pp. : 872-890

Disclaimer: Any content in publications that violate the sovereignty, the constitution or regulations of the PRC is not accepted or approved by CNPIEC.

Previous Menu Next

Abstract

Related content

On Monitoring and Collusion in Hierarchies

By Kessler A.S.

Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 91, Iss. 2, 2000-04 ,pp. : 280-291

Academic Press

Access to resources Recommend Favorite

The Effect of Private Information and Monitoring on the Role of Accounting Quality in Investment Decisions

CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Vol. 27, Iss. 1, 2010-03 ,pp. : 1-1

John Wiley & Sons Inc

Access to resources Recommend Favorite

The Effect of Private Information and Monitoring on the Role of Accounting Quality in Investment Decisions*

CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Vol. 27, Iss. 1, 2010-03 ,pp. : 17-47

John Wiley & Sons Inc

Access to resources Recommend Favorite

Impossibility of Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring with Flexible Production

By Sannikov Yuliy Skrzypacz Andrzej

The American Economic Review, Vol. 97, Iss. 5, 2007-12 ,pp. : 1794-1823

American Economic Association

Access to resources Recommend Favorite

Multimarket Contact, Imperfect Monitoring, and Implicit Collusion

By Matsushima H.

Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 98, Iss. 1, 2001-05 ,pp. : 158-178

Academic Press

Access to resources Recommend Favorite