Chapter
2.1. MFN (Most-Favored-Nation) Ad Valorem Import Tariffs Under the WTO
2.1.1. MFN Applied Rates, Tariff Bindings/Caps, and Binding Commitments
2.1.2. MFN Applied Tariffs Across Sectors
2.1.3. MFN Applied Tariffs Within Sectors by End-Use
2.1.4. Changes to MFN Applied Tariffs Over Recent History
2.2. MFN Specific Duties Under the WTO
2.3. Ad Valorem Import Tariffs Under Preferential Trading Arrangements
2.3.1. Major Economies and Their Preferential Trading Arrangements
2.3.2. Preferential Tariffs Across Countries
2.3.3. Tariff Preferences Offered by the United States
2.4. Other Import Tariffs Beyond MFN and Bilateral Tariff Preferences
3. Border Policies Beyond Import Tariffs
3.1. Temporary Trade Barriers of Antidumping, Countervailing Duties, and Safeguards
3.2. Quantitative Restrictions, Import Quotas, and Tariff Rate Quotas
3.3. Price Undertakings and Voluntary Export Restraints
3.4. Import Licensing, Customs Valuation, and Trade Facilitation
4. The Historical Evolution of Border Barriers Under the GATT
4.1. Pre-GATT 1947 Tariff Levels and Tariff Trends Over the GATT Period
4.2. Changing Tariff Rates Under the GATT
4.3. GATT Exceptions and the Rise of Major Carve-Outs
4.3.1. Emergency Import Restrictions to Address Balance of Payments Problems
4.3.2. Japan's GATT Accession and the ``Temporary´´ Article XXXV Exception
4.3.3. The Rise of Voluntary Export Restraints, Including the Multifiber Arrangement
4.3.5. Special and Differential Treatment for Developing Countries
4.3.6. Antidumping in Historical Perspective
4.4. Implications for the Contemporary Landscape of Trade Policy
5. Behind-the-Border Policies
5.1. Behind-the-Border Policies Affecting Supply
5.1.1. Domestic Subsidies: Aircraft, Agriculture, Semiconductors, and Clean Energy
5.1.2. Other Supply-Side Policies: Competition, Production Standards, Environment and Labor
5.2. BTB Policies Affecting Demand
5.2.1. Taxes, Foreign Investment Measures, and Local Content Requirements
5.2.2. Other Demand Policies: Consumer Safety, Product Labeling, and IPRs
5.3. Final Caveats on BTB Policies
A.2. Temporary Trade Barriers (Antidumping, Safeguards, and Countervailing Duties) Data
A.3. Historical Data from the GATT Archives
Chapter 2: The Political Economy of Commercial Policy
1. Socially Optimal Policy: A Cursory Review
1.2. Imperfect Competition
1.3. Foreign Asset Issues
1.4. Social Welfare Maximizing Policy Without Lump-Sum Transfers
2. What We Know About the Demand for Protection
2.1. Studies Based on Behavior of Politicians
2.2. Studies Based on Elections
2.3. Studies Based on Survey Data
2.4. General Observations
3. Political Conditions Shape Commercial Policy
3.1. Electoral Competition: Theory
3.2. Electoral Competition: Empirics
3.3.1. Informational Lobbying
3.3.2. Influence Peddling
3.3.3. General Observations
3.4.2. The Ederington–Minier Calamity and Other Critiques
3.4.3. Other Contributions
3.4.4. General Observations
3.5. Legislative Bargaining
4. Feedback Effects: Political Conditions Are Also Endogenous
Chapter 3: The Effects of Trade Policy
1.1. Does Trade Policy Matter?
1.2. Conceptual Issues and Focus of This Chapter
2.1. Overview of Methodology
2.2. Methodological Challenges
2.2.1. Measurement of Trade Policy
2.2.2. Aggregation and Heterogeneity
2.2.3. Endogeneity of Trade Policy
2.2.4. Anticipation of Trade Reform and Reduction in Uncertainty About Trading Environment
3. The Effects of Trade Policy: Trade Volume, Prices, Extensive Margin, and Gains from Trade
3.1. Effects on Trade Volume
3.1.1. Evidence on Effects on Trade Volume
3.1.2. Trade Growth vs Trade Elasticity and Gains from Trade
3.1.3. Trade Elasticity and Trade Policy
3.3. Effects on the Extensive Margin
3.4. Effects on Aggregate (Static) Gains from Trade
4. The Effects of Trade Policy on Firms: Productivity, Costs, and Markups
5. The Effects of Trade Policy on Labor Markets
6. The Effects of Trade Policy on Aggregate Growth and Poverty
7. The Effects of Trade Policy: Secondary Distortions, Misallocation, the Role of Policy Uncertainty, and Dynamics
7.1. Effects of Secondary Distortions and Misallocation
7.2. The Role of Trade Policy Uncertainty
Chapter 4: Quantitative Models of Commercial Policy
2.1.2. Equilibrium in Levels
2.1.3. Equilibrium in Changes
2.1.4. First-Order Conditions
2.2.1. Elasticity Estimation
2.2.1.2. Caliendo and Parro (2015)
2.2.3.3. Cooperative Tariffs
4.2. Other Trade Policy Applications
4.3. Applications in Other Fields
Part II: Trade Agreements: Legal Background, Purpose and Design
Chapter 5: Legal Aspects of Commercial Policy Rules
1. The Hierarchy of Rules
2.1.1. GATT Article II and the Tariff Bindings
2.1.2. National Tariff Schedules
2.1.3. Plugging Loopholes in GATT Article II
2.1.4. Renegotiation of Tariff Bindings
2.1.5. Progressive Tariff Liberalization
3. MFN Obligations and Exceptions
3.3.1. Customs Unions and Free Trade Areas (RTAs)
3.3.1.2. Special Legal Features of RTAs
3.3.2. Special and Differential Treatment
4. Domestic Tax and Regulatory Policies: National Treatment
4.2. Internal Regulations
4.3. Mixing Regulations/Local Content Requirements
4.4. Exceptions: Government Procurement and Subsidies
5. The General Exceptions to GATT: Articles XX and XXI
6. The Technical Barriers Codes
6.2. MFN, National Treatment, and Exceptions
6.3. Scientific Evidence Requirements
6.4. Harmonization and Reference to International Standards
6.6. Consistency Requirements
6.7. Notice, Comment, and Transparency Requirements
7.2.1. ``Subsidy´´ and ``Specificity´´
7.2.2. Prohibited Subsidies
7.2.3. Actionable Subsidies
7.2.4. Countervailing Duties
8.2. Antidumping Law vs Antitrust Law
8.3. The Puzzling Persistence of Antidumping Law
9.1. Textual Prerequisites for Safeguard Measures
9.2. Issues in Application and Developments in WTO Jurisprudence
9.2.1. Increased Quantities
9.2.2. Unforeseen Developments and Obligations Incurred
9.2.3. Industry Definition
9.2.5. Causation and Nonattribution
9.3. Remedial Issues and the Balance of Concessions
10. Miscellaneous Legal Issues
10.1. Subsidiary Governments
10.2. Accession and Accession Protocols
10.3. Waiver, Amendment, and Plurilaterals
10.4. The Relationship Among WTO Agreements
11. Trade in Services (GATS)
Chapter 6: Dispute Settlement in the WTO: Mind Over Matter
2. The Uruguay Round and the Birth of the DSU
2.1. Uruguay to Geneva: The Makings of the DSU
2.1.1. Background of the Negotiation
2.1.2. Section 301, and the Turn to Unilateralism
2.2. Curbing Unilateralism
2.2.1. Section301: Loved in DC, Hated Everywhere Else
2.2.2. The Price to Stop Section 301
2.3. Remedies in Case of Noncompliance
2.3.1. Transatlantic Harmony
2.3.3. Some Preferred Persuasion
3. Dispute Adjudication in WTO
3.1.1. An ``Exclusive´´ Forum for WTO Members Only
3.2.2. Bilateral, and yet so Multilateral
3.3. Litigation Before a Panel
3.4. Litigation Before the AB
3.5. Enforcement of Decisions
3.5.1. Compliance Process
3.5.3. It is a Long Way to Tipperary (or Is It?)
4.2. Calculating the Amount of Countermeasures
4.3. Property, or Liability Rules?
5.1. Prospective Remedies, Specific-, and Diffuse Reciprocity
5.2. Specific-, Diffuse Reciprocity, and Compliance with the WTO
5.4. Constraining Punishment
6. Section 301: A Foe and a Friend of Multilateralism
Annex I. Duration of Process
Annex II. Recourse to Article 22 of the DSU (Jan. 1, 1995-Jan. 2, 2016)
Chapter 7: The Purpose of Trade Agreements
2. International Externalities from Unilateral Trade Policies
2.1. Welfare-Maximizing Policy Makers
2.2. Why a Formal Agreement?
2.3. Trade Agreements among Politically Minded Governments
2.4. Is it All About the Terms of Trade?
2.5. Market Distortions and Corrective Policies
2.6. Critiques of the Theory
3. International Externalities With Imperfect Competition
3.1. Firm-Delocation Externalities
3.2. Profit-Extracting and Profit-Shifting Externalities
3.3. Profit-Extracting Externalities in International Outsourcing Relationships
3.4. International Agreements to Protect Intellectual Property
4. Trade Agreements as Commitment Devices
5. Incentives to Form Regional or Preferential Trade Agreements
5.1. The Ohyama-Kemp-Wan Theorem
5.2. Terms-of-Trade Gains
5.3. Political Incentives for Regional or Preferential Agreements
5.4. PTAs as Stepping Stones to Multilateral Free Trade
Chapter 8: The Design of Trade Agreements
2. Diagnosis of the Problem
2.1. Competitive General-Equilibrium Model of Trade Agreements
2.1.2. Prisoners' Dilemma
2.2. Competitive Partial-Equilibrium Model of Trade Agreements
2.2.1. Partial-Equilibrium Model
2.2.2. Prisoners' Dilemma
2.2.3. Missing Instruments in the Partial-Equilibrium Model
2.3. Monopolistic Competition Model of Trade Agreements
2.3.1. Monopolistic Competition Model
2.3.2. Prisoners' Dilemma
2.4. Offshoring Model of Trade Agreements
2.4.2. Prisoners' Dilemma
2.6. GATT's Designers and the Terms-of-Trade Externality
3.1. Reciprocal Liberalization
3.1.1. The GATT Principle of Reciprocity
3.1.2. The Applications of Reciprocity in the GATT/WTO
3.1.3. The Political Optimum as a Focal Outcome of GATT/WTO Negotiations
3.1.4. Reciprocity and the GATT/WTO Bargaining Process
3.2. Reciprocity and the Terms-of-Trade Theory Under Alternative Assumptions
3.3. Reciprocity Beyond the Terms-of-Trade Theory
4.1. A Three-Country Model, Discriminatory Tariffs, and MFN
4.1.1. Discriminatory Tariffs
4.2. MFN Plus Reciprocity
4.2.1. The Bilateral Opportunism Problem and the Free-Rider Problem
4.2.2. MFN Plus Reciprocity
4.3. Multilateral Reciprocity
Handbook of Commercial Policy
( Volume 1A )
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