Chapter
5.1 INC engagement approaches and demands
9.1 Kidnapping/hostage-taking in Bayelsa state, 2004–07
12.1 Educational distribution of respondents by village
12.2 Respondents’ employment in oil MNCs by village
12.3 Nature of respondents’ employment by village
12.5 CSR roles and government agencies
13.1 State and clan affiliation of ‘hosts’ to the Soku gas plant
5.1 Projects of the presidential committee on the disbursement of the1.5 per cent oil-producing areas development fund
5.2 Comparison of revenue allocation to six geopolitical zones of Nigeria
12.1 Conceptual linkage of CSR and conflict in the Niger Delta
12.2 Corporate–community relations practices
12.3 Comparison of monthly allocations to Rivers state and other Nigerian states
13.1 The region around the Soku gas plant
Background to the conflict in the Niger Delta
PART ONE | Causes of conflict, state (in)capacities
1 | The Nigerian state, oil and the Niger Delta crisis
Revisiting the ‘resource war’ perspective to violent conflict
The technologies and politics of dispossession
Alienation, group mobilization and violent conflicts
Conclusion: the imperative of resource ownership and control
2 | Capacity and governance deficits in the response to the Niger Delta crisis
Salient dimensions of the Niger Delta conflict
Elements of a comprehensive response
Capacity and governance aspects of the response crisis
3 | The struggle for resource control and violence in the Niger Delta
Resource control and petro-violence in the Niger Delta
Resource control and the future of petro-violence
Resource control, peace and sustainable development in the Niger Delta
4 | The Niger Delta crisis and the question of access to justice
Access to justice: some conceptual issues
Law, legitimacy and access to justice
Law, the Nigerian state, oil, and the implications for access to justice in the Niger Delta
The legislative framework
Impediments in the judicial system
The move towards activism as an alternative means of seeking justice
The government’s response to the rise in activism
5 | The Ijaw National Congress and conflict resolution in the Niger Delta
Ijaws and the Niger Delta
Figure 5.1 Projects of the presidential committee on the disbursement of the 1.5 percent oil-producing areas development fund
Ijaw nationalism and the formation of the INC
Table 5.1 INC engagement approaches and demands
The INC’s agenda for conflict resolution in the Niger Delta
Interrogating the INC’s agenda for resource control, conflict resolution and peace-building in the Niger Delta
Figure 5.2 Comparison of revenue allocation to six geopolitical zones of Nigeria
6 | Changing the paradigm of pacification: oil and militarization in Nigeria’s Delta region
The evolution of an unending crisis
Oil, militarization and the banality of state power
Multinational oil companies and the militarization of extraction
The more things change …? Oil and the future of the Niger Delta
7 | Nigeria’s oil diplomacy and the management of the Niger Delta crisis
Oil multinationals and the Nigerian state: more than a partnership of convenience?
Oil MNCs and their home governments
Government strategies for managing the Niger Delta crisis
The international dimension to government’s management of the Niger Delta crisis
The global securitization of the Niger Delta: emerging challenges for Nigeria’s oil diplomacy
PART TWO | Conflict actors’ dynamics
8 | ‘Mend Me’: the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta and the empowerment of violence
Neopatrimonialism as social practice
Social banditry and neopatrimonial structures
The nature of the insurgency
9 | Popular and criminal violence as instruments of struggle in the Niger Delta region
Conceptual and analytical notes
The oil economy and the emergence of militant agitation in the Niger Delta
Youth militias in the Niger Delta: complexities and colorations
From protesters to militias
Table 9.1 Kidnapping/hostage-taking in Bayelsa state, 2004–07
Popular violence and the insurgency in the Niger Delta
Criminal violence in the Niger Delta
10 | Swamped with weapons: the proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons in the Niger Delta
The proliferation of small arms and light weapons
The drivers behind the proliferation
Methods of sourcing small arms and light weapons
The devastating impact of small arms and light weapons
11 | Women’s protests in the Niger Delta region
Conflict: theorizing women’s protests
Women’s protests in the Niger Delta region
Organization of women’s protests in the Niger Delta
Factors engendering women’s protests in the Niger Delta region
Women’s protests – successes or failures?
PART THREE | Oil MNCs’ response(s)
12 | Corporate social responsibility and the Niger Delta conflict: issues and prospects
Oil multinationals and the dynamics of CSR strategies in the Niger Delta: trends and issues
Figure 12.1 Conceptual linkage of CSR and conflict in the Niger Delta
Figure 12.2 Corporate–community relations practices
CSR–conflict nexus: conceptual framework
Corporate Social Responsibility and conflict in the Niger Delta: opportunities and challenges
The CSR–conflict nexus: structural constraints
Table 12.1 Educational distribution of respondents by village
Table 12.2 Respondents’ employment in oil MNCs by village
Table 12.3 Nature of respondents’ employment by village
The CSR–conflict nexus: CSR practices and systemic issues
The CSR–conflict nexus: questions of an enabling environment
Table 12.4 Public sector roles
Table 12.5 CSR roles and government agencies
Figure 12.3 Comparison of monthly allocations to Rivers state and other Nigerian states
Emerging issues and conclusion
13 | Labelling oil, contesting governance: Legaloil.com, the GMoU and profiteering in the Niger Delta
Soku: conflict transformation and territorial security
Map 13.1 The region around the Soku gas plant
Table 13.1 State and clan affiliation of ‘hosts’ to the Soku gas plant
From the ‘whole community’ to the GMoU
14 | Conclusion: amnesty and post-amnesty peace, is the window of opportunity closing for the Niger Delta?
Peace initiatives under President Yar’Adua (2007–09)
Post-amnesty DDR: how wide a window?
Conclusion: peering through a half-open, half-closed window