Central Bank Independence and Fiscal Policy: Can the Central Bank Restrain Deficit Spending?

Publisher： Cambridge University Press

E-ISSN： 1469-2112|47|1|47-70

ISSN： 0007-1234

Source： British Journal of Political Science, Vol.47, Iss.1, 2015-07, pp. : 47-70

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