Publisher： John Wiley & Sons Inc
E-ISSN： 1465-7295|56|2|1047-1063
ISSN： 0095-2583
Source： ECONOMIC INQUIRY, Vol.56, Iss.2, 2018-04, pp. : 1047-1063
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Abstract
We construct a model of corporate tax competition in which governments also use public infrastructure investment to attract foreign direct investment, thus enhancing their tax bases. In doing so, we allow for cross‐border infrastructural externalities. Depending on the externality, governments are shown to strategically over‐ or underinvest in infrastructure. We also examine how tax cooperation influences investment in infrastructure and find that welfare may be lower under tax cooperation than under tax competition; this is the case when infrastructure is very effective in raising the tax base and generates a large negative cross‐border externality. (JEL F23, H40)
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