Payoff equivalence of efficient mechanisms in large matching markets

E-ISSN： 1555-7561|13|1|239-271

ISSN： 1933-6837

Source： THEORETICAL ECONOMICS, Vol.13, Iss.1, 2018-01, pp. : 239-271

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