Author： Hawthorne John
Publisher： Springer Publishing Company
ISSN： 0031-8116
Source： Philosophical Studies, Vol.158, Iss.3, 2012-04, pp. : 493-501
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Abstract
Claims of the form `I know P and it might be that not-P' tend to sound odd. One natural explanation of this oddity is that the conjuncts are semantically incompatible: in its core epistemic use, `Might P' is true in a speaker's mouth only if the speaker does not know that not-P. In this paper I defend this view against an alternative proposal that has been advocated by Trent Dougherty and Patrick Rysiew and elaborated upon in Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath's recent
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