Preference Signaling in Matching Markets

Author： Coles Peter   Kushnir Alexey   Niederle Muriel  

Publisher： American Economic Association

ISSN： 1945-7669

Source： American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Vol.5, Iss.2, 2013-05, pp. : 99-134

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