From Assured Defeat to `The Riddle of Soviet Military Success': Anglo-American Government Assessments of Soviet War Potential 1941-1943

Author： Kahn Martin

Publisher： Routledge Ltd

ISSN： 1351-8046

Source： The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol.26, Iss.3, 2013-07, pp. : 462-489

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Abstract

At the beginning of the Soviet-German war in June 1941 most Anglo-American Government officials believed in a swift collapse of Soviet resistance. When the collapse did not materialize assessments gradually changed and a more realistic outlook on Soviet war potential was eventually produced. But it was not until the late summer of 1943 that the Anglo-Americans finally believed in a more sustained Red Army offensive effort against the Germans, and even then US observers still underestimated Soviet strength. During the whole period 1941-1943 British observers generally had a relatively more realistic apprehension of Soviet capabilities. The Anglo-American perceptions and the change in perceptions, considering the whole context of World War II, had implications for the Western Allied war effort.