消息
loading
On the Social Desirability of Patents for Sequential Innovations in a Vertically Differentiated Market

Author: Lambertini Luca  

Publisher: Springer Publishing Company

ISSN: 0931-8658

Source: Journal of Economics, Vol.90, Iss.2, 2007-03, pp. : 193-214

Disclaimer: Any content in publications that violate the sovereignty, the constitution or regulations of the PRC is not accepted or approved by CNPIEC.

Previous Menu Next

Abstract

We consider a market for vertically differentiated goods where firms enter over time, after having developed innovations characterised by different quality levels. We show that patent height and length interact to determine the ultimate emergence of duopoly. In general, imposing quality improvements on later entrants entails the persistence of monopoly, while a duopoly equilibrium emerges when the second innovator is allowed to produce a sufficiently inferior quality and the patent protection granted to the first innovator is not too long-lasting.