JUST WAR, NONCOMBATANT IMMUNITY, AND THE CONCEPT OF SUPREME EMERGENCY

Author: Chan David K.  

Publisher: Routledge Ltd

ISSN: 1502-7570

Source: Journal of Military Ethics, Vol.11, Iss.4, 2012-12, pp. : 273-286

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Abstract

The supreme emergency exemption proposed by Michael Walzer has engendered controversy because it permits violations of the jus in bello</i> principle of discrimination when a state is faced with imminent defeat at the hands of a very evil enemy. Traditionalists among just war theorists believe that noncombatants should never be deliberately targeted in war whether or not there is a supreme emergency. Pacifists, on the other hand, reject war as immoral even in a supreme emergency. Unlike Walzer, neither just war traditionalists nor pacifists make a special case for supreme emergencies. In this paper, I borrow Walzer's concept to provide support for a different ethics of war that limits war to supreme emergencies. In non-supreme emergency situations, I agree with pacifists in rejecting war even if just war requirements are satisfied. But in supreme emergencies, I agree with just war traditionalists that war can be legitimately fought provided that moral constraints that protect noncombatants are respected.