Proxy Functions, Truth and Reference

ISSN： 0039-7857

Source： Synthese, Vol.111, Iss.1, 1997-04, pp. : 73-96

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Abstract

Quine's ontological relativity is related to Tarski's theory of truth in two ways: Quine ``repudiates term-by-term-correspondence'', as does Tarski's rule of truth; and Quine's proxy argument in support of relativity finds exact formulation in Tarski's truth definition. Unfortunately, relativity is threatened by the fact that the proxy argument doesn't comply with the rule of truth (Tarski's celebrated condition (T)). Despite Quine's express allegiance to (T), use of proxy schemes does not generate all of the true sentences condition (T) requires. A possible adjustment is to drop (T), retain the satisfaction definition and proxy argument, and appeal to the theory of observation and indeterminacy of reference as grounds of relativity. But as we shall see Quine's theories of assent to observation sentences and of reference-learning don't square easily with his naturalism. The first attributes intentional attitudes to observers; and the second assumes a holistic context principle and a concept of individuation which do not withstand scrutiny as empirical notions. Both appear to violate Quine's behavorist canon. A saving alternative is a theory of term-reference that appears in Roots of Reference and affords a return to behaviorism, and reinstatement of the proxy argument and relativity in a way compatible with Tarski's (T).