Author： Pelczar Michael W.
Publisher： Springer Publishing Company
ISSN： 0039-7857
Source： Synthese, Vol.138, Iss.1, 2004-01, pp. : 49-78
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Abstract
I offer a theory of propositional attitude ascriptions that reconciles a number of independently plausible semantic principles. At the heart of the theory lies the claim that psychological verbs (such as ``to believe'' and ``to doubt'') vary in content indexically. After defending this claim and explaining how it renders the aforementioned principles mutually compatible, I argue that my account is superior to currently popular hidden indexical theories of attitude ascription. To conclude I indicate a number of ramifications that the proposed theory has for issues in epistemology, philosophy of mind, and formal semantics.
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