Author： Kelp Christoph
Publisher： Springer Publishing Company
ISSN： 0039-7857
Source： Synthese, Vol.179, Iss.3, 2011-04, pp. : 409-433
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Abstract
In a number of recent papers Duncan Pritchard argues that virtue epistemology’s central ability condition—one knows that p if and only if one has attained cognitive success (true belief) because of the exercise of intellectual ability—is neither necessary nor sufficient for knowledge. This paper discusses and dismisses a number of responses to Pritchard’s objections and develops a new way of defending virtue epistemology against them.
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