Retail contracting and costly monitoring: Theory and evidence

Author： Lafontaine F.   Slade M.E.  

Publisher： Elsevier

ISSN： 0014-2921

Source： European Economic Review, Vol.40, Iss.3, 1996-04, pp. : 923-932

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