The Choice of Agrarian Contracts in Early Renaissance Tuscany: Risk Sharing, Moral Hazard, or Capital Market Imperfections?

Author： Ackerberg D.A.   Botticini M.  

Publisher： Elsevier

ISSN： 0014-4983

Source： Explorations in Economic History, Vol.37, Iss.3, 2000-07, pp. : 241-257

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