A note on three-player noncooperative bargaining with restricted pairwise meetings

Author： Calvo-Armengol A.  

Publisher： Elsevier

ISSN： 0165-1765

Source： Economics Letters, Vol.65, Iss.1, 1999-10, pp. : 47-54

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