Informed principal, moral hazard, and the value of a more informative technology

Author： Chade H.   Silvers R.  

Publisher： Elsevier

ISSN： 0165-1765

Source： Economics Letters, Vol.74, Iss.3, 2002-02, pp. : 291-300

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