Low and high types in asymmetric first-price auctions

Author： Fibich G.   Gavious A.   Sela A.  

Publisher： Elsevier

ISSN： 0165-1765

Source： Economics Letters, Vol.75, Iss.2, 2002-04, pp. : 283-287

Disclaimer: Any content in publications that violate the sovereignty, the constitution or regulations of the PRC is not accepted or approved by CNPIEC.

Previous Menu Next

Abstract

Related content

Rationalizable bidding in first-price auctions

By Battigalli P.   Siniscalchi M.  

Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 45, Iss. 1, 2003-10 ,pp. : 38-72

Elsevier

Access to resources Recommend Favorite

Using all bids in parametric estimation of first-price auctions

By Li T.   Vuong Q.  

Economics Letters, Vol. 55, Iss. 3, 1997-09 ,pp. : 321-325

Elsevier

Access to resources Recommend Favorite

A Simple Model of Expert and Non-Expert Bidding in First-Price Auctions

By Piccione M.   Tan G.  

Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 70, Iss. 2, 1996-08 ,pp. : 501-515

Academic Press

Access to resources Recommend Favorite

Replacing Sample Trimming with Boundary Correction in Nonparametric Estimation of First‐Price Auctions

By  

JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMETRICS, Vol. 30, Iss. 5, 2015-08 ,pp. : 739-762

John Wiley & Sons Inc

Access to resources Recommend Favorite

Affiliation and Entry in First-Price Auctions with Heterogeneous Bidders: An Analysis of Merger Effects

By Li Tong   Zhang Bingyu  

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Vol. 7, Iss. 2, 2015-05 ,pp. : 188-214

American Economic Association

Access to resources Recommend Favorite