Evolutionary selection of 'chivalrous' conventions in coordination games without common expectations

Author： Lilly D.K. Swat K. Krzychowicz G. Sacco P.L. Sandri M.

Publisher： Elsevier

ISSN： 0176-2680

Source： European Journal of Political Economy, Vol.11, Iss.4, 1996-04, pp. : 663-681

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