Difference-Form Contests and the Robustness of All-Pay Auctions

Author： Che Y.-K.   Gale I.  

Publisher： Elsevier

ISSN： 0899-8256

Source： Games and Economic Behavior, Vol.30, Iss.1, 2000-01, pp. : 22-43

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