From 'Is' to 'Ought' in Moral Epistemology

Author： Sinnott-Armstrong W.  

Publisher： Springer Publishing Company

ISSN： 0920-427X

Source： Argumentation, Vol.14, Iss.2, 2000-05, pp. : 159-174

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