Mixed-strategy equilibria and strong purification for games with private and public information

Author： Fu Haifeng  

Publisher： Springer Publishing Company

ISSN： 0938-2259

Source： Economic Theory, Vol.37, Iss.3, 2008-12, pp. : 521-532

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