

Author: Surridge Keith
Publisher: Routledge Ltd
ISSN: 0308-6534
Source: Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol.36, Iss.3, 2008-09, pp. : 417-434
Disclaimer: Any content in publications that violate the sovereignty, the constitution or regulations of the PRC is not accepted or approved by CNPIEC.
Abstract
In 1897, when the Pathan tribes on Britain's frontier with Afghanistan revolted, many British officials and soldiers blamed the Afghan amir Abdur Rahman for causing the trouble. There were fears that Abdur Rahman, as the self-professed champion of Islam, had commanded the tribes to undertake holy war against the British. They feared also that his alleged calls for jihad might be heard and answered within India and even beyond. Because they ruled more Muslims than any other empire, the British were always very sensitive about Islamic hostility. Yet, most British officials saw the amir's friendship as vital, not only for ensuring peace on a volatile frontier, but for wider strategic concerns about Russian expansion. Thus the events on the north-west frontier had, for the British, profound religious and strategic, local and imperial, implications. This article, therefore, intends to shed light on the amir's relations with Britain and to show the extent, if any, of his involvement in the rising and how the British dealt with their prickly and ambiguous friend.
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