Color Eliminativism and Intuitions About Colors

Author: Arstila Valtteri  

Publisher: Rosenberg & Sellier

ISSN: 0035-6212

Source: Rivista di estetica, Vol.43, Iss.1, 2010-03, pp. : 29-45

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Abstract

The philosophical debate over the nature of color has been governed by what we have learnt from color vision science and what color phenomenology suggests to us. It is usually thought that color eliminativism, which maintains that physical objects do not have any properties that can be identified with colors, can account for the former but not the latter. After all, what could be more obvious than the external world to be colored? Here i outline one color eliminativistic response to the objections based on phenomenology.