Multiple Penalty Mechanisms in a Principal–Agent Model under Different Institutional Arrangements

ISSN： 0147-5967

Source： Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol.27, Iss.1, 1999-03, pp. : 168-189

Disclaimer: Any content in publications that violate the sovereignty, the constitution or regulations of the PRC is not accepted or approved by CNPIEC.

Previous Menu Next

Abstract

Related content

On the Existence of Optimal Contract Mechanisms for Incomplete Information Principal-Agent Models

By Balder E.J.

Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 68, Iss. 1, 1996-01 ,pp. : 133-148

Academic Press

Access to resources Recommend Favorite

On the generalized principal-agent problem: a comment

By Ollier Sandrine

Review of Economic Design, Vol. 11, Iss. 1, 2007-06 ,pp. : 1-11

Springer Publishing Company

Access to resources Recommend Favorite

On the Role of Commitment in a Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal

By Jost P.J.

Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 68, Iss. 2, 1996-02 ,pp. : 510-530

Academic Press

Access to resources Recommend Favorite

Multinational Investment Attraction: Principal-Agent Considerations

By Mudambi Ram

International Journal of the Economics of Business, Vol. 6, Iss. 1, 1999-02 ,pp. : 65-79

Routledge Ltd

Access to resources Recommend Favorite

Stock-Returns and Inflation in a Principal-Agent Economy

By Jovanovic B. Ueda M.

Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 82, Iss. 1, 1998-09 ,pp. : 223-247

Academic Press

Access to resources Recommend Favorite