Author： Shin H.S. Williamson T.
Publisher： Academic Press
ISSN： 0899-8256
Source： Games and Economic Behavior, Vol.13, Iss.2, 1996-04, pp. : 252-268
Disclaimer: Any content in publications that violate the sovereignty, the constitution or regulations of the PRC is not accepted or approved by CNPIEC.
Abstract
We study Bayesian coordination games in which players choose actions conditional on the realization of their respective signals. Due to differential information, the players do not have common knowledge that a particular game is being played. However, they do have common beliefs with specified probabilities concerning their environment. In our framework, any equilibrium set of rules must be simple enough so that the actions of all players are common belief with probability 1 at every state. Common belief with probability close to 1 will not do. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D82.
Related content
Intertemporal common agency and organizational design: How much decentralization?
European Economic Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 7, 1995-08 ,pp. :
Access to resources
Recommend
The “How” Matters as Much as the “Who”
Industrial and Organizational Psychology, Vol. 10, Iss. 3, 2017-08 ,pp. :
Common p -Belief: The General Case
Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 18, Iss. 1, 1997-01 ,pp. :
Common Belief of Rationality in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma
By Stuart H.W.
Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 19, Iss. 1, 1997-04 ,pp. :