Author: Cadot O. Sinclair-desgagne B.
Publisher: Academic Press
ISSN: 0899-8256
Source: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol.17, Iss.1, 1996-11, pp. : 129-134
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Abstract
This note extends the usual method for finding totally mixed strategy equilibria in 2x2 matrix games to the computation of randomized Markov equilibria in infinite-horizon discrete-time stochastic games. It is shown that the method can be applied in the class of separable sequential games with binary action sets when continuation payoffs are monotone in each player's own-mixing probabilities. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73.
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