Author: Boldrin M. Rustichini A.
Publisher: Academic Press
ISSN: 1094-2025
Source: Review of Economic Dynamics, Vol.3, Iss.1, 2000-01, pp. : 41-78
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Abstract
We model pay-as-you-go social security systems as the outcome of majority voting within a overlapping generations model with production. When voting, individuals make two choices, pay the elderly their pensions or default, which amount to promise themselves next period. Under general circumstances, there exist equilibria where pensions are voted into existence and maintained. Our analysis uncovers two reasons for this. The traditional one relies on intergenerational trade and occurs at inefficient equilibria. A second reason relies on the monopoly power of the median voter. It occurs when a reduction in current saving induces a large enough increase in future return on capital to compensate for the negative effect of the tax. We characterize the steady state and dynamic properties of these equilibria and study their welfare properties.
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