Author： Dancy Jonathan
Publisher： Brill
ISSN： 1745-5243
Source： Journal of Moral Philosophy, Vol.4, Iss.1, 2007-04, pp. : 85-98
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Abstract
In this paper I consider what might be my best response to various difficulties and challenges that emerged at a conference held at the University of Kent in December 2004, the contributions to which are given in the same volume. I comment on Crisp's distinction between ultimate and non-ultimate reasons, and reply to McKeever and Ridge on default reasons, and to Norman on the idea of a reason for action. I don't here consider what other particularists might want to say; I certainly don't think that my way of doing these things is the only possible one, but not surprisingly I am interested in seeing what resources it might have to defend itself.
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