Pareto-Improving Social Security Reform

Author: Belan P.  

Publisher: Springer Publishing Company

ISSN: 0926-4957

Source: The GENEVA PAPERS on Risk and Insurance Theory, Vol.23, Iss.2, 1998-12, pp. : 119-125

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Abstract

It is generally accepted that moving from an unfunded to a funded social security system implies a welfare loss for the transition generation—that is, the generation that has to pay twice: first, saving for its own retirement and, second, contributing to the pensions of the then retired generation. This article shows that in a setting of endogenous growth with positive externality such a transition can be Pareto improving. But it argues also that social security reform is more a pretext than a requirement for internalizing such a positive externality.