The Consequences for a Monopolistic Insurance Firm of Evaluating Risk Better than Customers: The Adverse Selection Hypothesis Reversed

Author： Villeneuve B.  

Publisher： Springer Publishing Company

ISSN： 0926-4957

Source： The GENEVA PAPERS on Risk and Insurance Theory, Vol.25, Iss.1, 2000-09, pp. : 65-79

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