Author: Agüera M.
Publisher: Routledge Ltd
ISSN: 0959-2318
Source: Small Wars & Insurgencies, Vol.12, Iss.3, 2001-09, pp. : 115-135
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Abstract
The fact that NATO's 'first war' in Kosovo was labeled an uncertain victory can be traced back to Western statesmen's reluctance to risk casualties among alliance troops. In the aftermath of the Kosovo 'war', it is clear that while inflicting considerable damage on Serbia's infrastructure, NATO's air strikes could not prevent ethnic cleansing and also caused considerable collateral damage. However, the very nature of air power made it impossible to achieve NATO's primacy objectives in the Balkans. Although air power is an indispensable instrument for any kind of military intervention, statesmen tend to overuse relatively risk-free air strikes to avoid stronger military commitments. This causes problems not only for the ones on behalf of whom the intervention is conducted but also harms air power's usefulness as a military instrument of foreign policy.
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