Author： Méon Pierre-Guillaume
Publisher： Springer Publishing Company
ISSN： 1043-4062
Source： Constitutional Political Economy, Vol.17, Iss.3, 2006-09, pp. : 207-216
Disclaimer: Any content in publications that violate the sovereignty, the constitution or regulations of the PRC is not accepted or approved by CNPIEC.
Abstract
This note studies the volatility of the policy chosen by a committee whose members’ preferences are volatile, due to common and individual preferences shocks. It is shown that majority voting mitigates the latter but not the former. The volatility of the policy is smaller the smaller the volatility of members’ preferences, smaller the larger the size of the committee, and smaller than if it was chosen by a single member. The results hold in a context of uncertainty and with multidimensional issues.
Related content
Price discrimination and majority voting
Economics Letters, Vol. 76, Iss. 2, 2002-07 ,pp. :
Access to resources
Recommend
Majority Rule in a Stochastic Model of Bargaining
Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 103, Iss. 1, 2002-03 ,pp. :
The Costs of Implementing the Majority Principle: The Golden Voting Rule
By Baharad Eyal
Economic Theory, Vol. 31, Iss. 1, 2007-04 ,pp. :
Majority runoff elections: Strategic voting and Duverger's hypothesis
THEORETICAL ECONOMICS, Vol. 10, Iss. 2, 2015-05 ,pp. :
Probabilities of Preferences and Cycles withSuper Majority Rules
By Tovey C.A.
Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 75, Iss. 2, 1997-08 ,pp. :