Pinocchio's Pupil: Using Eyetracking and Pupil Dilation to Understand Truth Telling and Deception in Sender-Receiver Games

Author： Wang Joseph Tao-yi   Spezio Michael   Camerer Colin F.  

Publisher： American Economic Association

ISSN： 0002-8282

Source： The American Economic Review, Vol.100, Iss.3, 2010-06, pp. : 984-1007

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