The Evolution of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: Experimental Evidence

Author： Bó Pedro Dal Fréchette Guillaume R.

Publisher： American Economic Association

ISSN： 0002-8282

Source： The American Economic Review, Vol.101, Iss.1, 2011-02, pp. : 411-429

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