Selective Trials: A Principal-Agent Approach to Randomized Controlled Experiments

Author： Chassang Sylvain   Miquel Gerard Padró i   Snowberg Erik  

Publisher： American Economic Association

ISSN： 0002-8282

Source： The American Economic Review, Vol.102, Iss.4, 2012-06, pp. : 1279-1309

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