Author： Maskin Eric Tirole Jean
Publisher： American Economic Association
ISSN： 0002-8282
Source： The American Economic Review, Vol.94, Iss.4, 2004-09, pp. : 1034-1054
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Abstract
We build a simple model to capture the major virtues and drawbacks of making public officials accountable (i. e., subjecting them to reelection): On the one hand, accountability allows the public to screen and discipline their officials; on the other, it may induce those officials to pander to public opinion and put too little weight on minority welfare. We study when decision-making powers should be allocated to the public directly (direct democracy), to accountable officials (called "politicians"), or to nonaccountable officials (called "judges").
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