Developments in Dynamic Mechanism Design An Ascending Auctions for Independent Values: Uniqueness and Robustness to Strategic Uncertainty

Author： Bergemann Dirk Morris Stephen

Publisher： American Economic Association

ISSN： 0002-8282

Source： The American Economic Review, Vol.97, Iss.2, 2007-05, pp. : 125-130

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