Author： Ettinger David
Publisher： Mohr Siebeck
ISSN： 0932-4569
Source： Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE, Vol.166, Iss.2, 2010-06, pp. : 365-385
Disclaimer: Any content in publications that violate the sovereignty, the constitution or regulations of the PRC is not accepted or approved by CNPIEC.
Abstract
We consider an auction setting, in a symmetric information framework, in which bidders, even if they fail to obtain the good, care about the price paid by the winner. We prove that the outcome of the first-price auction is not affected by identity-independent price externalities, while the outcome of the second-price auction is. In contrast, identity-dependent price externalities affect the outcome of both auction formats. In any case, the second-price auction exacerbates the effects of price externalities.
Related content
A decision system for competitive bidding
By Wood D.
European Journal of Marketing, Vol. 5, Iss. 4, 1993-12 ,pp. :
Access to resources
Recommend
By Engwall Lars
European Journal of Marketing, Vol. 10, Iss. 1, 1993-12 ,pp. :