Author： Rodman David
Publisher： Routledge Ltd
ISSN： 1470-2436
Source： Defence Studies, Vol.2, Iss.1, 2002-03, pp. : 109-126
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Abstract
The evolution of force structure and doctrine within the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is examined with respect to the concept of combined arms warfare. The article considers the Israeli experience of combined arms warfare in both full-scale and low-intensity conflict from the country's War of Independence (1948–49) to the present day. The IDF has been called upon to fight under a wide spectrum of environmental conditions and, as a consequence, its force structure and doctrine have had to be flexible enough to cover all of the possible contingencies posed by these variables. It is assessed that, for the foreseeable future, the IDF approach to combined arms warfare with respect to both full-scale war and low-intensity conflict will not undergo considerable change.
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