Pollution standards, technology investment and fines for non-compliance

ISSN： 0922-680X

Source： Journal of Regulatory Economics, Vol.44, Iss.2, 2013-10, pp. : 156-176

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Abstract

In this paper, we analyze whether it is socially desirable that fines for exceeding pollution standards depend not only on the degree of non-compliance but also on technology investment efforts by the polluting firms. For that purpose, we consider a partial equilibrium framework where a representative firm chooses the investment effort and the pollution level in response to an environmental policy composed of a pollution standard, an inspection probability and a fine for non-compliance. We find that the fine should strictly decrease with the investment effort when (i) there are administrative costs of sanctioning; (ii) the optimal policy induces non-compliance; and (iii) either the fine is sufficiently convex in the degree of non-compliance or the investment effort decreases marginal abatement costs significantly.