Independent central banks as a component of the separation of powers

Author： Bernholz Peter  

Publisher： Springer Publishing Company

ISSN： 1043-4062

Source： Constitutional Political Economy, Vol.24, Iss.3, 2013-09, pp. : 199-214

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