Do core-selecting Combinatorial Clock Auctions always lead to high efficiency? An experimental analysis of spectrum auction designs

Author： Bichler Martin   Shabalin Pasha   Wolf Jürgen  

Publisher： Springer Publishing Company

ISSN： 1386-4157

Source： Experimental Economics, Vol.16, Iss.4, 2013-12, pp. : 511-545

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