Tragedy of the Fiscal Common?: Fiscal Stock Externalities in a Leviathan Model of Federalism

Author： Wrede M.  

Publisher： Springer Publishing Company

ISSN： 0048-5829

Source： Public Choice, Vol.101, Iss.3, 1999-12, pp. : 177-193

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