Fiscal Illusion and Political Accountability: Theory and Evidence from Two Local Tax Regimes in Britain

Author： Gemmell N. Morrissey O. Pinar A.

ISSN： 0048-5829

Source： Public Choice, Vol.110, Iss.3-4, 2002-03, pp. : 199-224

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