Author: Davidovitch Lior Ben-Haim Yakov
Publisher: Springer Publishing Company
ISSN: 0048-5829
Source: Public Choice, Vol.145, Iss.1-2, 2010-10, pp. : 265-280
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Abstract
The modern theory of voting usually regards voters as expected utility maximizers. This implies that voters define subjective probabilities and utilities for different outcomes of the elections. In real life, these probabilities and utilities are often highly uncertain, so a robust choice, immune to erroneous assumptions, may be preferred. We show that a voter aiming to satisfice his expected utility, rather than maximize it, may present a bias for sincere voting, as opposed to strategic voting. This may explain previous results which show that strategic voting is not as prevalent as would be expected if all voters were expected utility maximizers.
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